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Randolph Sloof†and Mirjam van Praag
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September 18, 2007
Abstract
Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically
performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model im-
plies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal eﬀort is
unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast,
expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower eﬀort lev-
els for noisier performance measures. We conduct a real eﬀort laboratory
experiment and ﬁnd that eﬀort levels are invariant to changes in the distri-
bution of the noise term. This suggests that enriching the economic model
commonly applied within this area by including an expectancy parameter
is not needed.
Keywords: Performance measurement, expectancy theory, real eﬀort
experiments, agency theory, personnel economics.
JEL-codes: C91, J33
1 Introduction
Consider a sales representative who is responsible for selling a company’s prod-
uct in a particular geographic region. Her overall compensation w equals the
sum of a ﬁxed salary s and a given fraction b of overall sales. The state of the
economy in the region is quite stable, such that the demand for the company’s
product is not very noisy and mainly dependent on the sales rep’s selling eﬀort.
For concreteness, let sales equal y = a±50, where a reﬂects the non-contractible
∗First version: July 2004. This paper beneﬁtted from the helpful comments by Robert
Dur, Sandra Maximiano, Hessel Oosterbeek, Arno Riedl, Dirk Sliwka, Joep Sonnemans and
Liang Zou. Two anonymous referees provided very constructive remarks that improved the
paper considerably.
†Corresponding author: University of Amsterdam, School of Economics, Roetersstraat 11,
1018 WB Amsterdam, the Netherlands. tel: +31 205255241, fax: +31 205254310, e-mail:
r.sloof@uva.nl.
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eﬀort level of the sales rep (measured in e.g. hours per year). Here the noise
term equals either ε = −50 or ε = 50, with equal probabilities.
For some reason, a year later the sales rep is assigned to a diﬀerent region (or
a diﬀerent product line) in which demand is much more volatile. In particular,
overall sales now equal y = a±1000. To account for the higher risk involved, the
new compensation scheme w = z+by pays a higher ﬁxed wage (z > s) such that
the employee will not be tempted to terminate the contract. The commission
rate b, however, is kept the same. The question is whether the sales rep will
exert the same level of eﬀort as last year.
Economic theories of performance measurement and rewards typically make
use of a particular linear version of agency theory. Using this standard model
economists would answer the question aﬃrmatively: the eﬀort level actually
chosen in both regions is determined by exactly the same incentive constraint
c′(a) = b, where c(a) denotes the costs of eﬀort measured in money terms.
This is independent of the distribution of the noise term ε.1 The main driving
force behind this prediction is that the sales rep’s eﬀort level has no impact on
the amount of risk she faces. That is, she cannot aﬀect the variability in her
compensation by changing the amount of eﬀort she puts in.
Notwithstanding the above prediction, intuitively it seems likely that the
sales rep will put in less eﬀort in the second year. The idea is that she will not
only take the marginal eﬀect of eﬀort on sales into account, but also its absolute
eﬀect relative to the eﬀect of noise (i.e. the eﬀect of demand ﬂuctuations). This
intuition is an important element of expectancy theory, an inﬂuential psycho-
logical theory of motivation ﬁrst introduced by Vroom (1964):
“Whenever an individual chooses between alternatives that in-
volve uncertain outcomes, it seems clear that his behavior is aﬀected
not only by his preferences among these outcomes but also by the
degree to which he believes these outcomes to be probable. Psycholo-
gists have referred to these beliefs as expectancies. . . An expectancy
is deﬁned as a momentary belief concerning the likelihood that a par-
ticular act will be followed by a particular outcome. .. Expectancy
is an action-outcome association.” (p. 20)
One of the predictions derived from expectancy theory is that the incentive
to exert eﬀort will be stronger, the stronger the perceived relationship between
eﬀort and performance. In our earlier example this implies that, for a given
level of incentive intensity b, a performance measure with less noise will give
stronger incentives to exert eﬀort. The underlying idea is that agents will be
demotivated to exert eﬀort whenever the size of the (marginal) eﬀect of their
eﬀort on performance is small relative to the size of the eﬀect of noise. For
1The standard economic model does predict that a noisier performance measure leads to
a lower optimal commission rate b if the agent is risk averse because high powered incentives
based on risky measures require higher risk premia (i.e. a higher base salary). This is the
well-known tradeoﬀ between risk and incentives. However, given the commission rate b, the
agent would not adapt her eﬀort level to changes in the noise of the performance measure (see
Section 2 for a full discussion).
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example, when sales equal y = a± 1000 a “good” outcome (i.e. high sales) can
only occur when the noise term equals ε = 1000 and is thus largely independent
of the eﬀort level a. This will demotivate the agent to exert eﬀort in the ﬁrst
place.
Although expectancy theory is only rarely discussed within the economics
literature, it has received widespread acceptance in the ﬁeld of organizational
behavior. Within this ﬁeld, it is one of the most widely applied theories in
studies of incentive compensation. As a modern textbook on organizational
behavior puts it,
“Because of its profound organizational implications, expectancy
theory is one of the most popular theories of work motivation.”
(George and Jones 2005, p. 185)2
Furthermore, expectancy theory has been subjected to ample empirical test-
ing by psychologists. The meta-analysis of van Eerde and Thierry (1996, p.
581) reveals that the relationship between expectancy and eﬀort has received
mixed empirical support. However, as van Eerde and Thierry argue, many of
the empirical studies suﬀer from severe measurement problems. They there-
fore recommend that experiments are conducted to overcome the measurement
problems identiﬁed.
In this paper we follow this suggestion and test the relevance of eﬀort-
performance expectancy for incentive contracts by means of a controlled labo-
ratory experiment. Our design is inspired by the real eﬀort experiment of van
Dijk et al. (2001) and closely follows the example of the sales representative
given above. Just as in the example we vary the distribution of the noise com-
ponent while keeping everything else (e.g. incentive intensity b) constant. In
this way our design allows us to control expectancy in a speciﬁc manner such
that it resembles Vroom’s original idea much more closely than most tests of
expectancy theory so far (cf. van Eerde and Thierry).
We ﬁnd no evidence that eﬀort-performance expectancy is an important de-
terminant of the level of eﬀort exerted by our subjects. Their eﬀort choices
appear largely independent of the noise in the performance measure. We thus
obtain no evidence that the standard economic model of performance measure-
ment and rewards should be adapted by incorporating expectancy.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the linear variant
of the agency model that is widely used by economists studying performance
measurement and rewards. It is formally derived that in this model the incentive
constraint is independent of the noise in the performance measure. Section 3 dis-
cusses expectancy theory in more depth and relates this theory to the commonly
used (agency) model for studying the economics of performance measurement.
In particular, it argues that the latter model is insuﬃcient if expectancy would
be relevant. This section also discusses some measurement problems that have
2Likewise, Rollinson (2005, p. 219) states that “[Expectancy theory] is currently the most
inﬂuential process theory in academic circles.”
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hampered earlier empirical tests of expectancy theory. Section 4 deals with our
experimental design. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 The economic model to study performance
measurement and rewards
Principal-agent theory focuses on a situation in which an agent takes an action
a to increase output y. The agent’s action itself is non-veriﬁable; only output
can be contracted upon. This output is initially owned by the principal, but
she might share it with the agent by paying him a wage contingent on output
w(y). The agent’s utility over wage and eﬀort is given by U(w, a), with ∂U∂w > 0
and ∂U∂a < 0. The agent is thus action-averse. Output is assumed to depend
stochastically on a, such that it is uncertain ex ante how much the agent will
produce. The timing of events is as follows:
1. The principal oﬀers a compensation contract w(y) to the agent;
2. The agent either accepts or rejects the compensation contract. Rejection
yields him reservation utility U ;
3. If the agent accepts, he chooses an action a at private costs of c(a);
4. Uncertainty is resolved and output y becomes known;
5. The agent and the principal receive payoﬀs according to the contract
agreed upon.
The agency model in fact comes in various forms, depending on the exact as-
sumptions made about the agent’s preferences U(w, a) and how eﬀort a stochas-
tically maps into output y.3 Inspired by the work of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) on the optimality of linear compensation schemes in some complex con-
tracting environments, the performance measurement literature typically fo-
cuses on the so-called linear agency model.4 Key assumptions of this speciﬁ-
cation are Wolfstetter (1999, pp. 283-285) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005,
pp. 137-139):
A.1 The costs of eﬀort c(a) can be measured in money terms, such that the
agent’s utility function can be written as U(w, a) = U(w − c(a)) (with
U ′ > 0 and U ′′ ≤ 0);
A.2 The noise ε in the production function is additive: y = θ(a) + ε, with θ(·)
increasing and concave and E[ε] = 0;
A.3 The compensation contract is linear in output: w(y) = s+ b · y.
3See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) for a book-length treatment of the principal-agent
model in its various forms.
4See for example Baker (2002), Baker and Jorgensen (2003), Bushman et al. (2002), Datar
et al. (2001), Feltham and Xie (1994) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
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An important implication of this set of assumptions is that eﬀort incentives
are independent of the distribution of uncertainty. Put diﬀerently, the incen-
tive compatibility constraint, and thereby the agent’s optimal action choice, is
unaﬀected by the amount of noise in the performance measure. To illustrate





U(w − c(a˜)) dF (ε), (1)
where F (·) reﬂects the distribution of the noise term ε. Diﬀerentiating this
expression with respect to a˜ we obtain the ﬁrst order condition:∫








dF (ε) = 0.
Assumption A.2 implies that ∂y∂a˜ = θ
′(a˜) is independent of ε. Moreover, As-
sumption A.3 entails that ∂w∂y = b is independent of y, and thus, of ε. Hence the
ﬁrst order condition can be rewritten as
[
b · θ′(a˜)− c′(a˜)] · ∫ U ′(w − c(a˜)) dF (ε) = 0.
Given U ′ > 0 incentive constraint (1) thus reduces to
b · θ′(a) = c′(a). (2)
It immediately follows that the equilibrium eﬀort level that solves (2) is
independent of the distribution F (·). In particular, the variance in the noise
term σ2ε is predicted to have no eﬀect on eﬀort incentives.
Assumptions A.1 through A.3 suﬃce for this prediction, yet additional in-
tuition can be obtained by momentarily making the following three remaining
assumptions of the standard linear agency model:
A.4 Noise term ε is normally distributed; that is, ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε);
A.5 The agent has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences and
his utility function equals U(w, a) = − exp (−r · [w − c(a)]), where r > 0
is the risk aversion coeﬃcient (for r = 0 we have U(w, a) = w − c(a));
A.6 Linear production function and quadratic eﬀort costs: θ(a) = θ · a and
c(a) = k2a
2 (with θ, k > 0).
These additional assumptions allow an intuitive closed-form solution. Assump-
tions A.4 and A.5 together imply that the agent’s certainty equivalent of his
compensation contract w(y) equals
CE(s, b) = s+ b · θ(a)− c(a)− r
2
· b2 · σ2ε. (3)
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In this particular case expected utility maximization thus eﬀectively reduces
to mean-variance preferences.5 Together with Assumption A.6 we immediately
obtain that the agent’s equilibrium eﬀort level equals a∗(b) = b·θk , which is in-
dependent of the variance in the noise term σ2ε and the agent’s risk attitude
r. From expression (3) the intuition for this is straightforward. Although the
agent’s utility function does directly recognize the risk in the compensation con-
tract (see in particular the last term in CE(s, b) that reﬂects the risk premium),
there is nothing the agent can do to lower the size of the disutility this risk gen-
erates (action a does not aﬀect the risk premium). In making his action choice
there is thus no risk-return tradeoﬀ because lower eﬀort levels do not lead to
less risk.6
Whereas noise by itself does not aﬀect eﬀort incentives, the optimal incentive
intensity b∗ the principal chooses in the ﬁrst stage does depend on σ2ε. This
follows because the amount of noise aﬀects the participation constraint of the
agent, which equals ∫
U(w − c(a)) dF (ε) ≥ U. (4)




E[y − w(y)] = (1 − b) · θ(a)− s
s.t. constraints (2) and (4) .
In general, the solution b∗ to this program will depend on σ2ε. For example,




θ2 + r · k · σ2ε
.
The optimal incentive intensity follows from a tradeoﬀ between having to pay
the agent a risk premium to participate (cf. term r2 ·b2 ·σ2ε in (3)) and providing
him with incentives to put in high eﬀort. More noise (i.e. higher σ2ε) then lowers
the optimal incentive intensity b∗. But the important thing to note is that, for
a given value of b, the incentive compatibility constraint (2) is unaﬀected by the
5Mean-variance analysis is typically used in models of portfolio selection. Such an analysis
is consistent with expected utility maximization (where utility is deﬁned over outcomes) only
under certain conditions, of which Assumptions A.4 and A.5 are a special case. See Ingersoll
(1987, pp. 95-99) and Baron (1977) for elaborate discussions of the general conditions under
which this holds.
6There would be such a tradeoﬀ in the presence of for example multiplicative noise (cf.
Baker and Jorgensen 2003, Zabojnik 1996). When θ ∼ N(θ, σ2θ), the certainty equivalent of
the agent becomes CE(s, b) = s + b · θ · a − c(a) − r
2
· b2 · σ2ε − r2 · b2 · σ2θ · a2. The ﬁnal
term reﬂects that more eﬀort now also leads to more risk. With c(a) = k
2
a2 it then follows
that a∗(b) = b·θ
k+rb2σ2
θ
. The second term in the denominator now arises because the agent
recognizes that a higher eﬀort level will also lead to more risk. Because he is risk-averse, he
reduces his eﬀort level as compared to the situation without multiplicative noise (i.e. σ2θ = 0).
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noise term. Therefore, for a given compensation contract the agent’s eﬀort level
is independent of σ2ε.
The main prediction of the commonly used economic model of performance
measurement and rewards that we would like to test experimentally can thus
be summarized as follows:
(EcTh) Keeping the incentive intensity b ﬁxed, the agent’s eﬀort level is inde-
pendent of the noise in the performance measure as measured by σ2ε.
This prediction will be tested against the backdrop of the expectancy model
from organizational behavior and psychology, which suggests that σ2ε will be a




Motivational models developed in the organizational psychology literature are
commonly divided into two categories: one focuses on an individual’s internal
attributes (content theories) and the other focuses on the individual’s inter-
actions with the environment (process theories). Expectancy theory, as ﬁrst
developed by Vroom, is a process theory of motivation. It has held a major
position in the study of work motivation (cf. van Eerde and Thierry) and has
served as a rich source for theoretical innovations in various domains, such as or-
ganizational behavior and compensation (Lawler 1971, George and Jones 2005,
Rollinson 2005).
Expectancy theory identiﬁes three factors that play an interactive role in
motivation. The ﬁrst of these factors, eﬀort-performance (E-P) expectancy,
concerns the individual’s perception that eﬀort is positively correlated with per-
formance. The higher this E-P expectancy is, the more motivated the individual
will be to exert eﬀort. To be more precise, Vroom deﬁnes E-P expectancy as
the subjective probability that an action or eﬀort (E) will lead to an outcome
or performance (P). As we will discuss below, it is this factor that distinguishes
expectancy theory from the commonly used theoretical model in economics and
is therefore the focus of this study.
The second factor is the so-called performance-outcome (P-O) expectancy,
also referred to as instrumentality. It concerns a person’s expectation that his
remuneration is closely tied to his level of performance. This factor also has a
positive eﬀect on motivation to exert eﬀort.
The third factor is called valence and is a measure of the degree to which
an individual values a particular reward. Again, the higher this factor is, the
more motivated the individual will be. Figure 1, taken from Fudge and Schlac-
ter (1999), depicts the basic expectancy theory model constructed from E-P
expectancy, instrumentality and valence.
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[ Figure 1 ]
Expectancy theory thus points at three instruments that employers should
use in combination to increase an employee’s motivation: (i) increasing the sub-
jective expectations that greater eﬀort will lead to higher levels of performance
(E), (ii) strengthening the perceived link between performance and rewards (I),
and (iii) ensuring that employees value the rewards given for high performance
(V). These three factors are called the VIE-factors. To emphasize their inter-
active role in generating motivation, expectancy theory is typically summarized
by means of the following “equation”: MF = E · I ·V , where MF refers to mo-
tivational force. Unlike the economic theory of performance measurement and
rewards, however, expectancy theory is not cast in a rigorous formal analytical
model.
Notwithstanding the substantial looseness of the deﬁnitions within the ex-
pectancy model (cf. Harder 1991), the second and third factor of the model can
be nicely translated into the agency framework of Section 2. Instrumentality is
given by incentive intensity b, while valence refers to the agent’s utility function.
Both in expectancy theory and in agency theory wage w is valued positively and
eﬀort a negatively (besides w and a other arguments can easily be incorporated
in the utility function). The similarities between the two models might ex-
plain why, in the economics and management literature, expectancy theory and
agency theory are usually taken together and opposed to still some other behav-
ioral models (see, e.g. Harvey et al. 2001, and Pennings 1993). The ﬁrst factor,
however, distinguishes expectancy theory from the standard economic model
of performance measurement and rewards. It is exactly this expectancy factor
that may cause agents not only to react to the pay-performance sensitivity b
when they select their level of eﬀort, but also to the amount of noise in the
performance measure reﬂected by σ2ε. In this study we focus on the eﬀect of the
single factor expectancy (E) on the worker’s eﬀort level in isolation. Hence we
do not investigate how the three VIE-factors combine into worker motivation.
Recall the example of the sales representative given in the Introduction. Ex-
pectancy theory predicts that an agent will exert less eﬀort when the expectancy
(i.e. the perceived eﬀect of his eﬀort on ultimate performance) is low. Hence,
the sales rep is likely to exert less eﬀort when demand is more noisy because
the agent’s (relative) impact on the ﬁnal outcome becomes smaller. In terms of
the model of Section 2 this prediction from organisational behavior (OB) and
expectancy theory can be formulated as follows:
(OB-ExpTh) Keeping the incentive intensity b ﬁxed, the agent’s eﬀort level
decreases with the level of noise in the performance measure as measured
by σ2ε.
In the next section we discuss the design of an experiment meant to test
prediction EcTh against the prediction OB-ExpTh. However, before doing so,
we ﬁrst discuss some issues resulting from the application of expectancy theory
in empirical research.
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Because expectancy theory holds a major position in the study of work moti-
vation, it has been subjected to ample empirical testing. In a meta-analysis,
van Eerde and Thierry review the results from 77 studies that measure cor-
relations between the VIE-factors and ﬁve measures of work motivation, viz.
eﬀort, performance, preferences, choices and intentions. In general they ﬁnd
positive correlations for each factor in isolation. However, the results are mixed
insofar that some eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero whereas others are
not. This ambiguity also holds for the most interesting correlation for our pur-
poses, the one between expectancy and eﬀort.7 Combining the VIE-factors in
various ways does not lead to higher or more signiﬁcant eﬀect sizes. Because
expectancy theory explicitly predicts that the VIE-factors play an interactive
role in motivation, this may be taken as evidence that the model lacks validity.
As van Eerde and Thierry point out, however, many of the studies they have
reviewed have either used the various concepts in a way other than Vroom’s the-
ory originally implied or have measured them in such a way that the results they
produce might contain serious biases. They emphasize three aspects that can be
improved in future studies: (i) the (subjective versus objective) measurement of
both the VIE-factors and of work motivation, (ii) within-subjects analysis ver-
sus between-subjects analysis, and (iii) the measurement of correlations versus
the measurement of causal eﬀects. We brieﬂy discuss these three issues in turn.
The ﬁrst issue concerns the measurement of the VIE-factors and of work
motivation. With respect to the expectancy factor that is of main interest to
us, Vroom (pp. 28-30) proposes three approaches. The ﬁrst one is to measure
expectancies through (verbal) reports from individuals about the probability of
outcomes (i.e. subjectively). This approach has the lion’s share in the stud-
ies reviewed by van Eerde and Thierry. They criticize this approach because,
in case work motivation is also measured through self-reports, there is a risk
that the relationship between expectancy and work motivation is spuriously in-
ﬂated by common method bias and shared measurement error. The second and
third approach proposed by Vroom are hardly used and are best applicable in
experimental settings:
”One approach might be to assume that expectancies correspond
perfectly with the objective probabilities. . . . If a person has had a
considerable amount of experience in the situation attempting diﬀer-
ent courses of action and if he has been provided with prompt feed-
back following these actions, it might be appropriate to assume that
his expectancies approximate actual probabilities. . . . Alternatively
we might assume that expectancies are identical with communicated
probabilities. . . . The assumption that expectancies are completely
determined by communicated probabilities seems tenable when sub-
jects have little additional basis for judging probabilities and when
7Here eﬀort is either measured by objective measures such as time spent on a task or by
more subjective measures such as eﬀort ratings by supervisors, self-reports of eﬀort spent on
a task, and intended eﬀort.
9









they have not previously been deceived in experimentation.” (pp.
29-30)
The second issue raised by van Eerde and Thierry is that the correlations
between measures of work motivation and the VIE-factors are typically obtained
from a between-subjects analysis. They criticize this approach in that
”It is important to note that this is at variance with Vroom’s
(1964) idea of the model. Vroom referred to an individual’s force
as one which acts relative to other forces within the individual. As
such, a relation between VIE variables and a criterion [measure of
work motivation] should be performed according to a within-subjects
analysis. . . . It is unclear why so many empirical studies have used
the inappropriate between-subjects methodology, although the cum-
bersomeness of a within-subject test may have contributed to this.”
(p. 577)
The meta-analysis demonstrates that the within-subjects correlations are
signiﬁcantly higher than the between-subjects correlations when eﬀort is used
as a measure of work motivation. As van Eerde and Thierry (p. 582) note in
this regard: “Unfortunately, there are few within-subjects correlations within
our set of studies, and virtually all are based on self-reported criterion [i.e. work
motivation] measures that were simultaneously taken with the VIE variables.
Thus it is possible that these correlations are distorted by response bias.”
The third issue that van Eerde and Thierry raise is perhaps the most funda-
mental. They argue that a limitation of their meta-analysis is that the direction
of the eﬀects cannot be established because the eﬀect sizes they use in their anal-
ysis are correlations. It is thus unclear whether higher work motivation (eﬀort)
leads to higher expectancies, or whether the relationship is the other way around
as expectancy theory predicts.
A controlled laboratory experiment may overcome all the problems men-
tioned above. First of all, in the laboratory expectancy can be controlled by
means of communicated actual probabilities. As Vroom notes, the underly-
ing assumption that expectancies are fully determined by these communicated
probabilities is tenable when subjects believe that they are not being deceived.
Within experimental economics, no deception is the norm (cf. Friedman and
Sunder 1994, pp. 17-18). Moreover, subjects can accurately estimate actual
probabilities from the experience with the decision task gained in experimental
practice rounds and the prompt feedback following their actions. Another ad-
vantage of a laboratory experiment is that eﬀort (as measure of work motivation)
can be measured in an objective fashion; see the next section.
Second, in a laboratory experiment it is straightforward to confront the
same subjects with diﬀerent treatments, such that the data can be analyzed on
a within-subjects basis. Third, an experimental setting is ideal for assessing the
direction of the eﬀects. We can systematically vary expectancies (i.e. commu-
nicated actual probabilities) and measure the impact on observed eﬀort levels.
10









Finally, as noted above, empirical tests have proven it diﬃcult to assess the
interactivity of the eﬀects of the various VIE-factors. Therefore, the mere eﬀect
of expectancy is best measured when holding the other two factors constant. In
an experiment this is easily accomplished.
4 Experimental design
In many laboratory experiments that study eﬀort incentives, the worker’s eﬀort
decision corresponds to choosing a ”decision number”, with higher numbers
being increasingly costly. Because eﬀort is then measured in a highly abstract
and artiﬁcial way, the external validity of the results may be questioned. van
Dijk et al., for instance, argue that there is a clear diﬀerence between allocating
budgets and allocating real eﬀort. Another disadvantage of identifying eﬀort
with the choice of a decision number is the lack of commitment and/or intrinsic
motivation for performing the task. As these aspects may be important for the
behavioral eﬀect of eﬀort-performance expectancy, we chose to conduct a real
eﬀort experiment that closely follows the one of van Dijk et al.. In particular, we
adapted their setup such that Assumptions A.1 through A.3 made in Section 2
are satisﬁed as closely as possible. To improve external validity we also framed
the experiment in a labor market context (cf. Loewenstein 1999).
Below we ﬁrst describe the real eﬀort task subjects had to perform and how
they were rewarded. After that we provide an overview of our treatments and
sessions.
4.1 Description of real eﬀort task and payment scheme
Our subjects were requested to take the role of a sales representative of a par-
ticular company. Sales representatives are responsible for selling the company’s
product in two diﬀerent regions, labelled A and B. The career of sales reps lasts
for 30 years (rounds). In each year, their decision problem is how to divide
overall selling eﬀort over the two regions. In particular, in every year there is a
ﬁxed number n ∈ {25, 40} of working weeks available that have to be allocated
over the two regions. Each region is represented by a two-dimensional grid; see
Figure 2 below. Selling eﬀort takes the form of searching for high values in this
grid through trial and error.8 To each position (H,V ) in a grid corresponds
a function value h(H,V ), representing the eﬀect of eﬀort on overall sales in
that region. Subjects are asked to search for high values in the grids by taking
(horizontal or vertical) steps. Each step represents a working week.
[ Figure 2 about here ]
8This optimization task originates from the ergonomic literature (see e.g. Bridger and
Long 1984) and is also used in Montmarquette et al. (2004) and Pingle (1995, 1997).
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At the start of every year sales reps choose the region they want to start
searching. During the year they can switch from one region to the other when-
ever they like and return at their last position in the region. Subjects see on
their screens (see Figure 2) what result their last step has amounted to in the
region in which they were active. In the instructions subjects are explicitly in-
formed that there are diminishing returns to steps in each region (see below).
The year ends when exactly n steps have been made in the two regions together.
The subject’s actual overall sales in region J in year t equal the sum of the
value reached in that region, RJt, and a noise term, εJt (with J ∈ {A,B} and
t ∈ {1, .., 30}). These noise terms reﬂect the impact of the state of the economy
on overall sales and are drawn after a subject has ﬁnished his/her search in that
year. The probability distributions may diﬀer between the two regions (see the
next subsection where we discuss the treatments). In Figure 2 they are reﬂected
below the regions by means of little red blocks. The number of red blocks above
a particular value represents the probability of that value. After a year is over,
for each region separately one little red block is picked at random, and this gives
the outcome of the random factor εJt. This procedure is simulated visually on
the screen. At the end of every year sales representatives are compensated on
the basis of performance pay:
Wt = 25 + 0.5 · (RAt + εAt) + 0.5 · (RBt + εBt) . (5)
Here Wt represents the earnings of a sales representative in year t. Represen-
tatives thus obtain a ﬁxed wage of 25 points and a share of 50% of the overall
sales in each of the two regions. Note that the variability in compensation Wt
caused by the random factors εAt and εBt is independent of how eﬀort is allo-
cated over the two regions (i.e. independent of RAt and RBt). Subjects’ overall
real earnings equal the sum of their yearly earnings. (There was no show up
fee.) The conversion rate is such that 150 points in the experiment correspond
with 1 euro in money.
The parameters of the value function h(H,V ) that determines RJt diﬀer
across regions and over the years. They were chosen such that the function
h(H,V ) always equals a single peaked mountain with a maximum of 100. More-
over, in all cases RJt = 0 at the origin (H,V ) = (0, 0) where search starts, and
the shortest route to the maximum always consists of exactly 25 steps.9 Towards
the optimum the incremental value of an additional step decreases, represent-
ing that there are diminishing returns to eﬀort in each region. Subjects were
informed about these aspects of RJt.
Our eﬀort allocation task is similar to the one used by van Dijk et al.. In
their experiment subjects also divide eﬀort between two tasks A and B. The only
9Following van Dijk et al. we used the following general functional form: h(H, V ) =
100− [(a1H− b1)2+(a2V − b2)2+c(a1H− b1)(a2V − b2)]3/4. The maximum of 100 is reached
for H = b1
a1
and V = b2
a2
. Variations over regions and years are accomplished by varying the
parameters a1, a2, b1, b2 and c. In all cases
∣∣∣ b1a1
∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣ b1a1
∣∣∣ = 25 to ensure that the optimum is
always exactly 25 steps from the origin.
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diﬀerence is that we ﬁxed the overall number of steps subjects should take.10
The idea behind this setup is that each region (task) provides an opportunity
cost to allocating eﬀort to the other region. That is, the costs of taking a step in
one region is the lost opportunity of taking a step in the other region. The costs
of putting more eﬀort into one task can thus be measured by its opportunity
costs (i.e. in money terms). This is what Assumption A.1 in Section 2 requires.11
The yearly earnings (5) of representatives are linear in overall performance.
This is in line with Assumption A.3, with the incentive intensity b ﬁxed at 0.5.
Because the noise in overall performance in each task is additive, the essential
part of Assumption A.2 is satisﬁed as well. Yet this assumption also supposes
that the marginal productivity of eﬀort is known to the agent. This would come
down to informing subjects about the functional form h(H,V ) that underlies
the value functions in the two grids. Clearly this would change the nature of
the tasks completely and reduce them to formal optimization problems, rather
than searching through trial and error. Most importantly, the amount of eﬀort
exerted to solve these problems would not be easily measurable. We therefore
did not inform subjects about the exact functional form h(H,V ). We did secure,
though, that the (diminishing) marginal return to eﬀort is comparable across
regions. In each year the two value functions were chosen such that the function
in one region just equalled the one in the other region up to a rotation of either
90, 180, 270 or 360 degrees (this was unknown to the subjects).12 The degree of
10By doing so, we intended to keep the overall level of eﬀort exerted constant. van Dijk et
al. allowed subjects 50 seconds in which they could take as many steps as they liked (with
a 1.5 seconds delay in between steps). For their purposes it was important (just as it is for
us) to keep the extent to which subjects exert eﬀort constant over the diﬀerent treatments.
Therefore, they explicitly test whether the total number of steps taken does not vary between
treatments (and ﬁnd that this is indeed not the case). By ﬁxing the overall number of steps
in advance we avoided having to test for equality ex post (and run the risk of signiﬁcant
diﬀerences).
11Formally, for the eﬀort allocation task eﬀort incentives follow from the agent’s incentive
compatibility constraint:
(aAt, aBt) = arg max
(a˜At,a˜Bt)
∫
U (Wt (a˜At, a˜Bt) , c (a˜At + a˜Bt)) dF (εAt, εBt)
s.t. a˜At + a˜Bt = n.
Here it is assumed that the (utili y) costs of taking a step is independent of the region, that
is, c((a˜At, a˜Bt) = c((a˜At + a˜Bt). Plugging the ﬁxed overall eﬀort constraint in the agent’s




U (Wt (a˜At, n− a˜Bt) , c(n)) dF (εAt, εBt) .












U ′ (Wt, c(n)) dF (εAt, εBt) = 0.
Again, the agent’s optimal choice aAt is independent of the distribution of the noise terms




12This comes down to selecting equal parameter values in both regions except for a1 and a2
and to restrict these two parameters across regions in the following sense: |a1A| = |a1B | and
|a2A| = |a2B |. Thus, the optimal path and the location of the maximum are equal in both
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rotation varied randomly over the years. From an economic perspective subjects
thus had no reason at all to favor one of the regions above the other,13 and given
that the marginal return of a step is decreasing in the number of steps along the
optimal path, the economic model predicts that subjects take about the same
number of steps in the two tasks (cf. van Dijk et al., p. 196).
4.2 Treatments and sessions
Our main treatment variable is the distribution of the noise terms εAt and εBt.
The 30 years that a sales rep works for a ﬁrm are divided into 6 contract periods
of ﬁve years. Within each contract period, the distributions belonging to εAt and
εBt are kept ﬁxed. Between contract periods these distributions vary. Before
the start of a new year, subjects are informed about the probability distributions
belonging to the two regions (in a similar visual way as in Figure 2). They can
thus use this information for their decision with which region to begin.
Six diﬀerent distributions were chosen that varied in the variance σ2ε. Table
1 provides an overview of the distributions used, ordered from low to high
variance. Every distribution is a (possibly degenerate) symmetric three-point
distribution that can only take the values −x, 0, and x. For example, under
distribution −120/0/120 in Table 1, each of the three values −120, 0 and 120
are equally likely.
In each contract period we compare two distributions. The right half of
Table 1 provides an overview of the comparisons made. For ease of reference
we use α (β) to represent the distribution with the lower (higher) variance. In
the third contract period the noise terms εAt and εBt actually have the same
distribution. This contract period serves as a benchmark. Even in that case
a subject might, for whatever reason, put more eﬀort into any one of the two
regions. For example, subjects who are more risk averse might not want to
switch after 12n steps to the other region because that region will give higher
(and possibly negative) incremental values upon each step taken just after the
start. To account for such biases caused by unobserved individual preferences we
employ a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach; all comparisons are made relative
to the observed diﬀerences in the benchmark contract period 3 (with −20/20
vs. −20/20).
The other 5 contract periods compare distributions that diﬀer in their vari-
ance to various degrees. In the ﬁrst contract period, for example, εα can take
the values of −20 and 20 whereas εβ equals either −120 or 120. Because in
every region the maximum function value Rmax equals 100, under distribution
β bad luck (i.e. εβ = −120) then can never be compensated with search eﬀort to
obtain non-negative overall sales. This may especially weaken eﬀort incentives.
regions, except that they may be mirrored in diﬀerent quadrants of the two-dimensional grid.
13We also tested the equality of the perceived diﬃculty of the two regions by comparing
the ranked diﬀerence of the function value of coordinate h(1, 1) in every year across the
regions. This is the value that results after two steps if a player moves into the (most natural)
northeastern quadrant and proceeds into both the horizontal and the vertical direction. The
rank was not systematically higher or lower for either region (p = 0.978). We therefore
conclude that the two regions were indeed of comparable diﬃculty.
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Table 1: Distributions of the noise terms and the comparisons made
Label Distribution σ2ε Contract Years α versus β
−20/20 12 ◦ −20⊕ 12 ◦ 20 400 1 1 to 5 −20/20 vs. −120/120
−160/0/160 18 ◦ −160⊕ 34 ◦ 0⊕ 18 ◦ 160 6400 2 6 to 10 −80/80 vs. −120/0/120
−80/80 12 ◦ −80⊕ 12 ◦ 80 6400 3 11 to 15 −20/20 vs. −20/20
−120/0/120 13 ◦ −120⊕ 13 ◦ 0⊕ 13 ◦ 120 9600 4 16 to 20 −160/0/160 vs. −80/80
−120/120 12 ◦ −120⊕ 12 ◦ 120 14400 5 21 to 25 −120/120 vs. −180/0/180
−180/0/180 13 ◦ −180⊕ 13 ◦ 0⊕ 13 ◦ 180 21600 6 26 to 30 −20/20 vs. −80/80
Remark: The notation p ◦ −x⊕ (1− 2p) ◦ 0 ⊕ p ◦ x in the second column means that the noise term equals −x
with probability p, 0 with probability (1− 2p) and x with probability p. In the ﬁnal column α (β) represents the
low (high) variance distribution, i.e. σ2ε(α) ≤ σ2ε(β).
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In contrast, in the last contract period the β-distribution takes the values −80
and 80 with equal probabilities, such that it is possible to compensate bad luck
with high eﬀort. By including both comparisons we can establish whether eﬀort
incentives decrease proportionally with σ2ε.
For the comparisons made in periods 1 (−20/20 vs. −120/120) and 6
(−20/20 vs. −80/80) the increase in variance is clear cut; noise term εβ takes
more extreme values than εα does and distribution β is just a stretching of
distribution α. In the terminology of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, p. 229),
β diﬀers from α by a single mean-preserving spread. In contract periods 2,
4 and 5, in contrast, we compare a two-point distribution with a three-point
distribution. In all these cases the three-point distribution has the (weakly)
higher variance. (Note that in contract period 4, i.e. −160/0/160 vs. −80/80,
distribution α and β actually have the same variance.) On the face of it this
may not be obvious though, because under the three-point distributions not
only the extreme values are more extreme, but also ε = 0 becomes more likely.
Therefore, distribution β is not just a stretching of distribution α and it cannot
be obtained by a single mean preserving spread.14 We include these compar-
isons in order to test hypotheses EcTh and OB-ExpTh also for cases where σ2ε
increases in less obvious ways.
Apart from the distribution of the noise term we used the number of steps n
as a second treatment variable. A priori we were afraid that our results might
be sensitive to the number of steps n subjects should take in each year. We
therefore considered both the case in which the number of steps is relatively low
(n = 25) and the one in which n is relatively high (n = 40). To avoid confusion
every subject was confronted with one of these treatments only.
Overall we conducted four sessions. In the ﬁrst two sessions n = 40; in the
two remaining sessions n = 25. Moreover, between sessions we also varied the
identity of the region with the low variance distribution α. On the computer
screen region A always appeared on the left and region B always appeared on
the right. Clearly, subjects may have a bias for either side. For instance, they
might tend to start working at the left hand side, and this could aﬀect the total
number of weeks (steps) dedicated to that region.15 This would then bias the
results. For both values of n w therefore conducted one session in which region
A always has the low variance α-distribution, and another session in which
region A always has the high variance β-distribution.
The experiment was conducted in the CREED laboratory of the University
of Amsterdam in April 2004. Subjects were recruited by e-mail announcements.
Overall 74 subjects participated, with respectively 17, 23, 20 and 14 subjects
in the four diﬀerent sessions.16 Each subject participated in one session only.
14In contract periods 2 and 5 distributions α and β satisfy the so-called integral conditions
of Rothshild and Stiglitz. This implies that β can be obtained from α by a sequence of
single mean preserving spreads. Acccording to the four measures of riskiness distinguished by
Rothshild and Stiglitz, distribution β therefore displays greater uncertainty than α does. The
distributions used in contract period 4 cannot be ordered according to these criteria.
15van Dijk et al. ﬁnd evidence that is consistent with such a bias; see their Table 4.
16We recruited the same number of subjects (22) for each of the four sessions. The diﬀerences
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Most of the subjects were undergraduate students in economics. Sessions took
around one and a half hours. Each session started with an identical oral intro-
duction, read aloud to ascertain uniformity. After that subjects were randomly
allocated to positions in the computer room, where they could start reading
the instructions on their screen in the language of their choice (either English
or Dutch).17 After three practice rounds, the actual experiment started. Be-
cause this is an individual experiment, subjects could work at their own pace.
Subjects were paid immediately upon ﬁnishing the experiment and left the lab-
oratory subsequently. On average subjects earned almost 18 euros. Earnings
varied considerably though, with a minimum of 7.90 euros and a maximum of
26 euros.
5 Results
Standard economic theory predicts that the way in which subjects allocate their
eﬀort over the two regions is independent of the distribution of the noise terms
(cf. Hypothesis EcTh). Expectancy theory, on the other hand, predicts that
subjects will bias their eﬀort towards the region with the lower variance (i.e.
with distribution α). Eﬀort put into a region is measured in a number of diﬀerent
ways. The most important one is the number of steps taken in that region.
Other, more indirect measures of eﬀort that we explore are the percentage of
overall sales coming from a region (excluding the noise terms), the probability
that a subject starts working in a region, and the average marginal return for
the ﬁnal step taken in a region.18,19 Except for the last one, all these measures
are supposed to increase as eﬀort increases. On the contrary, due to diminishing
marginal returns towards the optimum, a higher marginal return to the ﬁnal
step indicates that less eﬀort is devoted to that region (i.e. it is an inverse
measure of eﬀort).
We ﬁrst look at the benchmark contract period 3 in which the two noise terms
have exactly the same distribution −20/20. Table 2 provides an overview of the
average amount of eﬀort put into region A according to the various measures of
eﬀort considered. Both the number of steps and the relative sales appear evenly
divided over the two regions. Also the average marginal return for the ﬁnal step
taken in a region is almost the same for the two regions. However, subjects do
seem to have a tendency to start with region A, which appears on the left hand
side of the screen.
in actual participation are due to no shows and spontaneous show-ups.
17The instructions in English are available from the authors upon request.
18We are thankful to an anonymous referee who suggested the last (inverse) measure of
eﬀort.
19The idea behind the starting region as a measure of eﬀort is that if subjects perceive one
region to be ”better” and thus worth more their eﬀort, they may want to start in that region.
However, we also ﬁnd a bias to start on the left (see below), suggesting that subjects use
simple clues to decide when they are indiﬀerent. The noise structure may just be another
simple clue to solve indiﬀerence. The starting region thus only provides a weak measure of
eﬀort at best.
17









The above impressions are conﬁrmed by statistical tests. We compare the (5
years) average amount of eﬀort a subject devotes to region A with the average
amount of eﬀort s/he puts forward in region B by means of a sign rank test
for matched pairs. Only in the fourth session do we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in the number of steps taken. Both in this session and in the second session
(and overall) subjects start signiﬁcantly more often with region A. There thus
appears a tendency to start on the left. No signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found for
relative sales and the marginal return to the ﬁnal step taken in a region.
Figure 3 depicts the descriptive statistics for each of the six contracting
periods separately. The ﬁrst panel concerns the number of steps in the low
variance region α, the second panel the relative sales in region α, while the
third panel reﬂects the propensity to start searching in region α. To allow an
insightful comparison between the low variance and the high variance region,
the remaining eﬀort measure is also depicted in a relative way. In particular,
panel D depicts as relative measure of eﬀort (ﬁnal marginal return in β − ﬁnal
marginal return in α) / ﬁnal marginal return in α. Positive values then reveal
that eﬀort put in the region with the lower variance α is higher (recall that ﬁnal
marginal return is an inverse measure of eﬀort).
Overall, the diﬀerent panels in Figure 3 do not show a clear pattern. Panels
A, B and C suggest, if anything, that subjects put slightly less eﬀort in the
low variance region than they put in the high variance region. Panel D yields
rather mixed results. Note, however, that these impressions from Figure 3 are
not derived from a rigorous within-subjects analysis.
[ Figure 3 about here ]
Our formal statistical analysis is based on a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences ap-
proach. For each eﬀort measure of Table 2 we calculate, for each individual
and each year, the diﬀerence between eﬀort in the region with the low variance
distribution α and the high variance distribution β.20 We subsequently take
the average of these diﬀerences for each contract period (i.e. we calculate for
each individual subject the average diﬀerence over the ﬁve years in which the
two distributions α and β stay the same). By means of sign rank tests we then
compare the observed diﬀerences in a particular contract period with those in
the benchmark contract period 3 where α = β = −20/20. Because these statis-
tical tests are based on a within-subjects comparison, our conclusions are not
biased due to diﬀer nces in ability or risk attitude between subjects. Moreover,
since we create an individual benchmark for every subject, the statistical tests
can be based on the overall pool of 74 subjects. Table 3 reports the p−values
obtained from the sign rank tests.
Out of 20 comparisons, only two appear signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In
contract period 2 the realized relative sales in the region with low variance
20Table 2 shows that region A corresponds with distribution α in sessions S1 and S3. In
sessions S2 and S4 region A corresponds with distribution β.
18









Table 2: Average outcomes in the benchmark (A = B as α = β = −20/20)
# of # of steps Relative Prob. Return last
Session n (A,B) subjects in A sales in A start in A step in A (B)
S1 40 (α, β) 17 20.05 50.24 0.59 2.87 (2.64)
S2 40 (β, α) 23 20.72 48.80 0.78∗∗∗ 2.46 (2.77)
S3 25 (α, β) 14 12.51 50.49 0.6 3.49 (3.46)
S4 25 (β, α) 20 13.41∗∗ 52.57 0.59∗∗ 3.57 (3.63)
all 74 17.04 50.47 0.65∗∗∗ 3.05 (3.10)
Remark: ∗∗∗(∗∗) signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from region B at 1% (5%) according to a sign rank test.













distribution α are signiﬁcantly lower than those in the corresponding region in
the benchmark period. This suggests that subjects allocate relatively more eﬀort
to distributions with a higher variance, in contrast to both hypothesis EcTh
and OB-ExpTh. The second signiﬁcant diﬀerence is that in contract period 6
subjects are less likely to start with region α than in the benchmark period.
This indicates that subjects prefer to start with the high variance distribution.
Overall, however, with 18 out of 20 insigniﬁcant diﬀerences, the data support
hypothesis EcTh. This holds true especially for our most important measure of
eﬀort, the number of steps taken in a region.
To further explore the validity of our conclusions we perform two types of
robustness checks. First we investigate whether learning could be an issue.
Perhaps the tendency to put in eﬀort in the low variance region increases as
subjects have done more rounds (years) in the experiment. This appears not
to be the case. When we rebuild Tables 2 and 3 using only the scores of either
the ﬁrst or the last year within a contract period (instead of the average over 5
years), almost identical results are obtained. The single important exception is
that we now ﬁnd a third signiﬁcant diﬀerence, viz. in contract period 6 relative
sales in region α are higher than in region β when we focus on the ﬁnal year
only. Overall, however, our results are robust.
Second, the same conclusions are also obtained when we perform our tests
at a less aggregate level. In particular, when we consider sessions S1 and S2
(with n = 40), and sessions S3 and S4 (where n = 25) in isolation, exactly the
same test results are obtained. This indicates that the number n of total steps
allowed plays no role. For the (α, β)-sessions S1 and S3 in isolation we get that,
apart from contract period 6, now also in contract periods 1 and 2 subjects tend
to start with the β-region more often than with the corresponding region B in
contract period 3. We thus obtain some evidence that subjects prefer to start
with the high variance region. However, as argued above the starting region is a
weak measure of eﬀort at best. The other, arguably more convincing measures
of eﬀort reveal that the ultimate allocation of eﬀort between the two regions is
independent of the distributions of the two noise terms.
Our within-subjects design adds to the conﬁdence we have in our insigniﬁcant
results. As explained in Subsection 3.2 our design follows the recommendations
of van Eerde and Thierry, who argue that a between-subjects methodology is
inappropriate. They also observe in their meta-analysis that within-subjects
correlations (between the VIE-factors and work eﬀort) are signiﬁcantly higher
than between-subjects correlations. From that perspective our within-subjects
analysis thus gives the Ob-ExpTh hypothesis a fair chance.21 If anything, in a
between-subjects design we would expect an even weaker correlation between
the noise in the performance measure and eﬀort.
It is important to keep in mind that our ﬁnding that subjects divide their
eﬀort about equally over the less noisy and the more noisy region provides no
21The typical concern raised by experimental economists against within-subjects designs
is that by exposing subjects to multiple conditions, one heightens their sensitivity to the
diﬀerences in conditions (cf. Camerer 2003, p. 42). Also from that perspective a within-
subjects analysis provides a conservative test of hypothesis Ob-ExpTh.
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Table 3: p−Values of comparisons across distributions (α versus β)
Contract α versus β # of steps Relative Prob. Return last
period in α sales in α start in α step in α
1 −20/20 vs. −120/120 0.201 0.147 0.258 0.634
2 −80/80 vs. −120/0/120 0.187 0.004 0.105 0.632
3 −20/20 vs. −20/20 Benchmark
4 −160/0/160 vs. −80/80 0.690 0.698 0.650 0.257
5 −120/120 vs. −180/0/180 0.728 0.730 0.191 0.794
6 −20/20 vs. −80/80 0.470 0.261 0.001 0.704
Remark: p−values are obtained from sign rank test for matched pairs.
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information at all about subjects’ underlying risk attitudes. In our experiment
the incentive scheme is such that subjects can do nothing to aﬀect the amount of
risk they face. The variability in their compensation (due to the additive noise
in the performance measure) is completely independent of their eﬀort allocation
choices. Therefore, economic theory predicts the same behavior for any level
of a subject’s risk aversion r ≥ 0 and our design cannot be used to infer risk
attitudes from observed choices (nor does it intend to do so).22
In sum, our results conﬁrm hypothesis EcTh and reject hypothesis OB-
ExpTh; subjects allocate their eﬀort irrespective of the amount of noise in the
performance measure.
6 Conclusion
The leading economic model within the performance measurement literature
is the linear agency model. One implication of this model is that the agent’s
incentive constraint is independent of the amount of (additive) noise in the per-
formance measure. The eﬀort level that a given compensation scheme induces
is thus predicted to be independent of the distribution of the noise term. A dif-
ferent prediction is obtained from expectancy theory, which suggests that more
uncertainty in the relationship between eﬀort and performance will demotivate
the agent to exert eﬀort. In this paper we present the results of a laboratory
experiment designed to test these opposing predictions. Subjects’ eﬀort choices
appear invariant to changes in the distribution of the noise term. Our results
thus validate the linear agency model in this respect and cast doubt on the
relevance of this particular aspect of expectancy theory.
In a meta-analysis of a large number of diﬀerent studies van Eerde and
Thierry ﬁnd some empirical support for the particular relationship between the
expectancy factor and eﬀort. However, they also point to three empirical draw-
backs pertaining to most tests of the rather loosely deﬁned expectancy theory:
(i) the use of subjective instead of objective measures of the relevant concepts,
(ii) the use of between-subjects analyses instead of the theoretically correct
within-subject analyses, and (iii) the measurement of correlations instead of
causal eﬀects. We have tried as much as possible to repair these empirical
shortcomings in our laboratory experiment. In that sense, our study is unique.
There are (at least) three potential explanations for the discrepancy between
our experimental results and previous ﬁndings. First, the shortcomings of most
previous empirical tests identiﬁed by van Eerde and Thierry may indeed have
biased the expectancy-eﬀort relationship upwards as the authors of the meta-
analysis suggest. Second, although our study is unique in the sense that we have
measured quite precisely the concepts related to expectancy theory, we may
22In contrast, Holt and Laury (2002) confront subjects with a menu of choices between a
”safe” lottery and a ”risky” lottery, where the ”risky” lottery has the higher variance. The
more risk-averse a subject is, the more often s/he will choose the ”safe” lottery. Because
subjects with diﬀerent risk attitudes are predicted to behave diﬀerently, the Holt and Laury
design permits measurement of the degree of risk aversion (and the speciﬁc functional form it
takes).
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have failed to measure them in an externally valid way. Third, we purposely
incorporated a real eﬀort task that has been used successfully by others to study
compensation issues (see e.g. van Dijk et al. 2001 and Montmarquette et al.
2004), yet it might still be the case that the kind of eﬀort subjects exert in
our experiment is not representative of eﬀort in real employment relationships.
For instance, searching for a high value in a two-dimensional grid may not
provide the same level of commitment and/or intrinsic motivation as actual
sales activities of real sales reps. If this is indeed the case our experiment fails
to capture some elements that are important for the behavioral eﬀect of eﬀort-
performance expectancy. Future experiments therefore might want to make use
of more realistic/representative tasks while keeping the same level of control.
The latter may prove diﬃcult, especially because the costs of eﬀort are hard to
measure and control.
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Figure 1: An expectancy theory model













Figure 2: Computer screen reflecting the subjects’ allocation problem









Figure 3 Descriptive statistics: effort put in region *
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In all panels:          n = 40       n = 25
* Remarks: Region  represents the region with the lower variance. In panel A effort is measured as the number of steps 
taken in this region, in panel B effort is represented by the relative earnings derived from region , whereas in panel C effort 
devoted to region  is measured as the proportion of rounds started in that region. In panel D effort is represented as the 
marginal gain of the final step taken in region  relative to region  (i.e. the final marginal return in region  minus the final 
marginal return in region  divided by the final marginal return in region ). The measure of effort would be positive in case 
individuals put more effort into region  (resulting in lower absolute levels of the final marginal return in this region as 
compared to the other region).
All measures of effort in each of the panels are shown for every contracting period separately (the values 1 to 6 on the 
horizontal axis). In each of the panels and for each of the separate contracting periods, the first (light) column shows the 
average value of the effort measure for the first two sessions in which the total number of steps was 40, whereas the second 
(dark) column shows the average effort level for sessions 3 and 4 with n = 25.
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